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Communications Law-CBS v. FCC: The Supreme Court
Upholds FCC Regulations Restricting Broadcaster
Discretion in Accepting Political Advertising
Candidates for federal office have a significantly greater right of access to
the broadcast media, but individual broadcasters have much less discretion in
refusing such access as a result of the decision by the United States Supreme
Court in CBS v. FCC.' Ruling that the Federal Communications Commission's regulations interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) 2 are constitutional and
within the statutory objectives, the Court approved a finding by the FCC 3 that
the statute created a new right of access instead of codifying a less pervasive
standing right of access arising out of a generalized public interest standard.
The majority agreed with the Commission's conclusion that section 312(a)(7)
creates a special right of access that "makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the
public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process." 4 But, as the dissent in CBS pointed out, the price of
promptly enforceable, increased access for federal candidates is greater Commission responsibility in political matters and a substitution of the judgment
for the historically protected judgment of the individual
of the Commission
5
broadcaster.
The case arose out of an October 11, 1979 request by the Carter-Mondale
Presidential Committee (Committee) to purchase air time from the three major television networks. The Committee intended to present a documentary
outlining the administration's record in conjunction with President Carter's
formal announcement of his candidacy. Gerald Rafshoon, acting for the
Committee, requested a thirty-minute program between 8 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.
on any day between December 4 and 7, 1979.6 Citing the large number of
candidates for the presidential nomination and the potential for disruption of
regular programming should all the candidates request equal time, CBS offered to sell only a five-minute segment at 10:55 p.m. on December 8 and a
five-minute segment in the daytime.7 Both ABC and NBC indicated that they
1. 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).

2. The statute in pertinent part is as follows:
(a) The commission may revoke any station license or construction permit(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase

of reasonable amounts oftime for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
3. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C.2d 631 (1979).
4. 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
dissenting) (quoting 74 F.C.C.2d at 682).
5. Id. at 2838-39 (White, J.,
6. Id. at 2817.
7. Id. at 2818.
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had not yet begun to sell time for the 1980 campaign, 8 although ABC did note
that it would begin sales in January 1980. 9 Charging that the networks had
violated their obligation under section 312(a)(7) to provide "reasonable access," the Committee filed a complaint with the FCC on October 29, 1979.10
The FCC, in a four-to-three vote, found that the networks had violated the
statute and that their reasons for refusing to sell time were "deficient" under
FCC standards of reasonableness." The FCC also asked the networks to indicate by November 26, 1979, how they would fulfill their statutory obligations. On their petition for reconsideration, the networks, by the same split
vote, again were found to have acted unreasonably, and the FCC issued a
clarifying memorandum. 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the Commission's orders.' 3 The court of appeals
concluded that section 312(a)(7) created a new right of access and that the
Commission had the authority to determine when a campaign has begun. The
court upheld the conclusion that the networks did not apply proper standards
and that the 1980 campaign had begun by November 1979.14
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, finding that
both on its face and in light of its legislative history, section 312(a)(7) grants an
affirmative right of access. The Court rejected the argument that the statute
merely codifies the prior public interest standard.15 The Court found the stat8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2819.

11. 74 F.C.C.2d at 649. Equal time requirements have been a part of communications law
since the first federal statute that regulated broadcast media, the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18,
44 Stat. 1162 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)). Section 315(a) now provides the
following:

(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided,
That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under
the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally
qualified candidate on any(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to
political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters,
in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
12. 74 F.C.C.2d at 657. The memorandum rejected arguments that the Commission improperly substituted its judgment for petitioner's. The Commission memorandum also held that section 312(a)(7) was intended to create a new right of access.
13. CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), af'd, 101 S.Ct. 2813 (1981).
14. Id.
15. For a description of the access requirements under a general public interest standard, the
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ute's focus on the individual candidate to be an indication that Congress intended more than a codification of a general duty. In addition, the Court saw
revocation-as evthe sanction for failure to afford reasonable access-license
16
idence of Congress' intent to create a new right.
Further, the Court viewed the somewhat scanty legislative history of the
provision as support for its finding of a new and additional right. The Court
noted that the broad intent of the three campaign reform bills taken up by
Congress in 1971 was "to increase a candidate's accessibility to the media and
to reduce the level of spending for its use."' 17 The purpose of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 was to "give candidates for public office
greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the
issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters." 18 The
Court also found compelling the so-called "conforming amendment"' 9 to section 315(a). This section, providing that broadcast licensees are not common
carriers to anyone wishing use of the airwaves, had, prior to the addition of
section 312(a)(7), read as follows: "No obligation is imposed upon any licensees to allow the use of its stations by any such candidate. 20 The conforming
amendment changed section 315(a) to read: "No obligation is imposed under
this subsection upon any licensee ... .,"21 According to the majority, the
amendment is "the most telling evidence of congressional intent" to broaden
22
access for federal candidates beyond former public interest standards.
Acknowledging the judicial deference paid to agency decisions in the absence of clear mistake, the Court found that the Commission had "consistently
23
construed the statute as extending beyond the prior public interest policy."
The Court also noted that, because Congress had been made aware of the
Commission's interpretations of section 312(a)(7), "Congress' failure to repeal
persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the one
or revise [the statute is] 24
Congress."
by
intended
In a review of Commission policies concerning section 312(a)(7), the
Court held the Commission's action "a reasoned attempt to effectuate the statute's access requirement, giving broadcasters room to exercise their discretion
Court cited Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68
F.C.C.2d 1079 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Report & Order]. Prior to the statute, "[n]o legally

qualified candidate had.., a specific right of access to a broadcasting station. However stations
were required to make reasonable, good faith judgments about the importance and interest of
particular races." Id. at 1088.
16. 101 S.Ct. at 2821.
17. Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1,S. 382, and S. 956 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971)
(remarks of Sen. Pastore).
18. S.Rep. No. 96, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1773, 1774.
19. S.Conf. Rep. No. 580, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1971); H. Conf.Rep. No. 752, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (1971) (discussed as a conforming amendment).
20. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064 (amended 1972).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
22. 101 S.Ct. at 2822.
23. Id. at 2823.
24. Id. at 2824 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965)).

1144

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

but demanding that they act in good faith." 25 The Court found that the Commission had not become involved improperly in the electoral process, although
under the ruling the agency would now have the power to determine whether a
campaign has begun and thus whether the obligations of section 312(a)(7) attach. 26 It further noted that the Commission does not set the starting date for
the campaign but instead "'take[s] into account the position of the candidate
and the networks as well as other factors.' "2 7 The Court found no merit in
petitioners' argument that the Commission's policies attach inordinate significance to candidates' desires, noting that the Commission requires "careful
28
consideration of, not blind assent to, candidates' desires for air time."
Applying Commission policies to the facts before it, the Court decided
that petitioners did not provide reasonable access. The Court found that ABC
and NBC had "blanket policies" of refusing access before a certain time, despite Commission warnings that such policies, without counteroffers, would be
deemed unreasonable.2 9 On the other hand, CBS, which had offered five-minute slots on two days, did not have sufficient justification for refusing the Committee's request, according to the Court. CBS had cited program disruption
and potential equal time burdens as reasons for refusing the Committee, but
view that such claims were "speculative
the Court upheld the Commission's
' 30
and unsubstantiated at best.
Finally, the Court rejected petitioners' assertion that their first amendment rights had been violated by the trimming away of their broadcaster discretion. The Court reaffirmed the notion that "[ilt is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."'3 1 The
Court essentially decided that the advantages of network presentation of information were "necessary for the effective operation of the democratic32 process"
and justified the creation of a limited right of access to the media.
Although the history of broadcast media regulation is short, 33 several major guiding principles have been developed. Central to the concepts governing
25. Id. at 2827 (footnote omitted).
26. 74 F.C.C.2d at 665-66.
27. 101 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 74 F.C.C.2d at 665).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2828. See 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1090.
30. 101 S. Ct. at 2828 (quoting 74 F.C.C.2d at 674.)
31. Id. at 2829 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). An
important decision that discussed at length the so-called "fairness doctrine" in broadcasting, Red

Lion concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of the FCC's promulgation of rules governing
broadcasters' obligation to provide free reply time to an individual who had been the subject of a

personal attack on the air. The Red Lion Court upheld the rules, deciding that the first amendment does not protect the private censorship of broadcasters who are licensed by the government
to use a scarce resource. 395 U.S. at 400.
32. 101 S. Ct at 2830.
33. For a brief history of the development of law governing radio and television, see Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1959). For a survey--elsewhere in

this issue-of FCC regulation practice, see Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow:
The FCC's Weak Track Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1057
(1982).
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regulation of the broadcast media is the fairness doctrine,34 articulated in the
1949 FCC report Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees. 35 That report concluded that the broadcast licensees' duty to the public is two-fold-broadcasters must (1) devote a reasonable amount of time to the coverage of
controversial and important issues and (2) provide reasonable opportunity for
contrasting viewpoints to be heard. 36 The report emphasized the importance
of broadcasters' discretion in meeting the goals of the doctrine. The Commission noted that the Communications Act rejected both censorship by the Commission and common carrier status for would-be users of air time. 37 In an
important Supreme Court decision on rights of access, CBS v. DemocraticNational Committee,38 Chief Justice Burger analyzed the development and
mechanics of the fairness doctrine as it relates to licensee responsibility:
The regulatory scheme has evolved slowly, but very early the licensee's role developed in terms of a "public trustee" charged with the
duty of fairly and impartially informing the public audience. In this
the
structure the Commission acts in essence as an "overseer" but
39
initial and primary responsibility.

. .

rests with the licensee.

So long as a licensee meets its "public trustee" obligation to provide balanced
coverage of the issues, it would appear to have broad discretion to decide what
that obligation will be.
The fairness doctrine requires adequate coverage of significant and controversial issues and fairness in presenting opposing views. Broadcast licensees must present such views at their own expense if no other sponsor is
available.4° Personal attack rules fall within the mandate of the fairness doctrine. When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public
issue, a licensee must notify the individual attacked of the the date and time of
the particular broadcast, furnish a script or tape of the attack and provide a
reasonable opportunity for the individual to respond.4 1 Exempted from this
requirement are attacks on foreign figures, those made by legally qualified
candidates or their spokesmen, and those made during bona fide newscasts or
34. For general background on the fairness doctrine, see B. Schmidt, Freedom of the Press
vs. Public Access 157-82 (1976); Houser, The Fairness Doctrine-An Historical Perspective, 47
Notre Dame Law. 550 (1972). See also Chamberlin, supra note 33, at 1059 nn. 3, 5 & 26.
The doctrine was codified into the Communications Act of 1959. Exempting news coverage
from the general requirements of equal opportunities it added the following language: "Nothing
in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters... from the obligations
imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity or the discussion of conlicting views on issues of public importance." Communications
Act of 1959, § 1, Pub. L. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1976)).
35. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
36. Id. at 1249.
37. Id. at 1247-48. See note 56 infra.
38. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). This case tested the legality of a broadcaster's refusal to accept political broadcasts unrelated to a campaign. Both the Democratic National Committee and the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace sought air time. A divided Court held that the first
amendment did not obligate broadcasters to air any particular sponsor's message. Id. at 121-23.
39. Id. at 117 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.).
40. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 573 (1966).
41. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a) (1980).
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on-the-spot coverage.42 In addition, when a licensee endorses a candidate,
the licensee must notify all other candidates for the office, and when the licensee opposes a candidate the licensee must notify that candidate of its position.
and offer to all affected
The licensee also must provide tapes or transcripts
43
candidates reasonable opportunities to respond.
The discretion allowed broadcasters under the fairness doctrine narrowed
somewhat during the sixties. In RedLion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC44 the Commission's rules concerning free replies to personal attacks were upheld by the
Supreme Court. The Court held that the listener's right to be informed is
more important than the broadcaster's right of discretion. 45 Further, the
Court distinguished the area of electronic media from print media by emphasizing the limited numbers of frequencies available for electronic broadcasters.
Because frequencies are scarce resources, "to deny a station license because
'the public interest' requires it 'is not a denial of free speech.' "46
47
The fairness doctrine complements the statutory equal time provisions.
Section 315 requires licensees to provide equal time to any legally qualified
candidate after another candidate for the same office has used the station for
campaign purposes.48 Subsection (a) of section 315 exempts newscasts from
the equal time requirement, 49 and subsection (b) prohibits licensees from
charging an amount for equal time slots that exceeds the price of comparable
advertising for other purposes. 50
" Access rights created under the personal attack rules, equal
time provisions and section 312(a)(7) have become a wedge between first amendment
protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. If freedom of
speech fully protects the right to speak effectively, the press loses its freedom to
decide what it will and will not print or air. Journalistic freedom in the print
media in this country has been curtailed primarily only by libel or obscenity
laws and for the most part has remained unregulated. 5 1 The broadcast media,
on the other hand, because of limits on the number of frequencies available,
has endured explicit access requirements from the beginning of its development. The very reply right declared unconstitutional in Miami HeraldPublishing Co. v. Tornilo,52 a case dealing with access to the print media, was upheld
by the RedLion Court because in a broadcast context the Court believed such
42. Id. § 73.1920(b).

43. Id. § 73.1930 (1980).
44. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
45. Id. at 390.
46. Id. at 389 (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 315(a).
50. Id. §315(b).
51. The Court rejected controls on the print media in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Court declared unconstitutional a Florida statute that
granted access to newspaper space for candidates to reply to personal attacks. The Court recognized that a responsible press is not mandated by the Constitution and cannot be legislated. Id. at
257.
52. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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access would enhance public debate.53
It is evident that rights of access such as those permitted under the personal attack doctrine and the equal time requirements of section 315(a)
evolved from the fairness doctrine. However, they undermine the licensee discretion that historically has been a substantial part of the doctrine. 54 Notions
of public trusteeship dictate the airing of controversial subjects, the delivery of
balanced coverage and the provision of a right of access to individuals best
suited to presenting competing viewpoints. On the other hand, a right of access triggered by an event such as a personal attack may vest in an individual,
judgment about the fairness in, or the public interest
regardless of a licensee's
55
in, granting access.
Ultimately, the relevant question in examining the extent of rights of access is one of control of the media. At one extreme are the notions of the
broadcast licensees as common carriers, rejected by Congress in both the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934.56 At the other extreme
is total broadcaster autonomy, labeled a form of private censorship by the Red
Lion Court.57 Access rights that cut against broadcaster freedom, however, of
necessity involve enforcement, bringing into play the "tightrope" of the access
question.
This role of the Government as an "overseer" and ultimate arbiter
and guardian of the public interest and the role of the licensee as a
journalistic "free agent" call for a delicate balancing of competing
interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years
has called on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightinto the Radio
rope" to preserve the First Amendment values written
58
Act and its successor, the Communications Act.
Four years after the Red Lion Court legitimized rights of access in a personal attack context, the Court in CBS v. Democratic National Committee
backed away from requiring that broadcasters accept non-candidate-oriented
political advertisements on the same basis as commercial advertisers. 59 The
access rights were to be overseen by the FCC, an idea that members of the
Court found frightening.
In this sensitive area, so sweeping a concept of Government activity
53. 395 U.S. at 390, 392.

54. See B. Schmidt, supra note 34, at 157.
55. Id. at 17. Schmidt characterizes rights of access that are triggered by a prior publication,

such as the equal time provision, as contingent rights of access. Affirmative rights of access exist
independent of prior triggering events. See CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d at 10-11.

56. A proposal that would permit a broadcasting station to be used as a common carrier by
any candidate for public office was rejected. Senator Clarence Dill urged the Senate to strike the

common carrier provision because the stations "would have to give all their time to that kind of
discussion." 67 Cong. Rec. 12,504 (1926). Instead, Dill successfully urged the Senate to pass the

equal time proposal. A similar pattern of discussions occurred in 1934, but common carrier status
for broadcasters again was rejected. See S. 2910, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 7716, 72d

Cong., IstSess. (1932); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110.
57. 395 U.S. at 392.
58. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 117.
59. Id. at 94.
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would go far in practical effect to undermine nearly a half century of
unmistakable Congressional purpose to maintain-no matter how
difficult the task-essentially private broadcast journalism held only
accountable to the public interest in the Communications
broadly
Act. 60
Congress in 1972 enacted the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971,61
a reform law aimed at curtailing large campaign contributions and expenditures. Title I included the provision codified as 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). Three
bills were introduced into the Senate that were intended to increase a candidate's accessibility to the media, to reduce the level of spending for its use and
"to give candidates for public office greater access to the media so that they
may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters." 62 The Senate report provides little explanation of
the amendment but notes that the duty of broadcasters under this provision is
inherent "in the requirement that licensees serve the needs and interests of the
[communities] of licensees." '63 Section 312(a)(7) was included to "emphasize
the public interest obligation inherent in making broadcast time available to
candidates covered by the spending limitation."' 64 The Senate report indicates
that the spending limitations should not result in "diminution in the extent of
such programming. ' 65 The conforming amendment, mentioned above, 66 provides that no obligation is imposed upon any licensee "under this subsection"67
to grant rights of access, implying, according to the majority view, that rights
of access had been created elsewhere. 68 The dissent in CBS v. FCC argued
that the statute originally stated that "no obligation is hereby imposed,"'6 9 and
that "hereby," the equivalent of "under this subsection," was omitted by the
codifier of the United States Code. The dissent, therefore, suggests that the
amendment restored the statute to its original state. 70 In the final analysis, the
legislative history of section 312(a)(7) is of little, if any, help in determining
the true purpose of the provision.
60. Id. at 120 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). For general
background of the access arguments and an extensive list of citations on the question, see Lange,
The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 2 n.5
(1973) (Lange is basically an opponent of increased access). See also Barron, Access to the
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967); Johnson & Weston, A
Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 Va. L. Rev.
574 (1971) (Barron, Johnson and Weston are vocal advocates of access rights).
61. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.).
62. S. Rep. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1773, 1774; see also Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and
S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
63. S. Rep. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1773, 1787.
64. Id. at 28, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1773, 1782.
65. Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1773, 1781.
66. See note 19 and text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
67. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(2)(B) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976)) (emphasis added).
68. 101 S. Ct. at 2822-23.
69. Id. at 2835 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
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Perhaps as a result of the "mixed signals" sent by Congress regarding the

intent behind section 312(a)(7) the Commission's administration of the section
does not set a clear course for broadcasters. Three major reports issued by the

FCC and a number of cases considered under section 312(a)(7) provide extensive, if not conclusive, precedent. The Commission quickly established that it

did not interpret the section to be a codification of the public interest standard. 7 1 The Commission's 1978Reort and Order 72 spells out what it consid-

ers to be relevant criteria for broadcasters to consider when deciding their
obligations under section 312(a)(7).73 After a candidate becomes "legally

qualified,"'74 the broadcaster must consider in good faith and on an individual

basis requests from federal candidates. 75 Broadcasters must consider the can-

didate's purpose in seeking air time and seek to accommodate the candidate's
interests as closely as possible. Other permissible considerations include the

amount of time previously sold to the candidate, the disruptive impact on
other programming and the potential for requests by opposing candidates for
equal time.76 The Commission report discourages across-the-board policies
and concludes that if a broadcaster demonstrates a consideration of these fac-

tors in reasonable good faith, the licensee is entitled to deference. 77 An earlier
interpretation of section 312(a)(7) asserted that "[t]he Commission will not
substitute its judgment for that of the licensee, but, rather, it will determine in
any case that may arise whether the licensee can be said to have acted reason-

ably and in good faith in fulfilling his obligations under this section."7 8 The
to glean
Commission reports and orders indicate that the agency was unable
79
provision.
the
behind
intent
legislative
the
from
much guidance
The final impact of CBS v. FCC is difficult to gauge, but there may be a
71. Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C.2d
510, 537-38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Policy Statement]; accord, Concerning Licensee Responsibility Under Amendments to the Communications Act Made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Public Notice] (overruled on
different grounds in Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087, 1091 (1977)); see also Public
Notice: The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2286-89 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 Primer]; 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1089-92.
72. See note 15 supra.
73. 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1090-91.
74. A legally qualified candidate is one who (a) is eligible under the law for the office, (b)
announces his candidacy or (c) qualifies for the nominating primary. 1978 Primer, supra note 71,
at 2216-18. Although President Carter did not meet these criteria at the time of his request, this
issue was not raised.
75. 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1089.
76. See CBS v. FCC, 629 F.2d at 19.
77. 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1089-94. See Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602, 604
(1973).
78. 1972 Policy Statement, supra note 71, at 536.
79. See 1974 Public Notice, supra note 71, at 517. Case precedents also demonstrate an unwillingness on the part of the Commission to set forth any specific rules for licensees to follow.
See, e.g., Summa Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 602 (1973). The licensee refused to grant five-minute spots to
a congressional candidate because of its policy against selling advertising exceeding one minute in
length, except during early-morning hours. The Commission, in its first opportunity to decide a
section 312(a)(7) case, found Summa's across-the-board policies unreasonable. Id. at 605. Still,
the opinion, in strong language, asserted that Congress intended to accord "complete freedom...
to the broadcaster and candidates to develop specific program formats for the appearance of a
candidate." Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1970)). The Commission empha-
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basis for FCC Commissioner Washburn's view that the governmental intrusion that results from the case "will have far-reaching consequences that will
'come back to haunt the Commission and the public again and again." 80 The
Supreme Court's majority opinion in CBS v. FCC is not a particularly compelling one. Although the legislative history of section 312(a)(7) provided substantial support for the majority's reasoning in upholding the FCC, the dissent
argued that the legislative history does not support the broad powers assumed
by the agency. As Justice White noted in his dissent, the majority's reliance, in
reaching its decision, on the 1971 Act's overall goal of providing greater candidate access may have been misplaced. This goal was achieved by other provisions in the Act, such as the provision requiring the sale of time at the lowest
unit charge available during specified periods.8 1 Justice White viewed section
312(a)(7) instead as a protective device to prevent broadcasters from limiting
access otherwise available but for the lowest-unit-charge limitations: "Section
312(a)(7) was primarily a device to insure that other provisions of the bill
would not dilute the preexisting public interest standard as applied to federal
elections." 82 Prior, unsuccessful attempts to codify a reasonable access requirement demonstrated that Congress on at least two other occasions had
intended to legislate access provisions that essentially codified the public interest standard.8 3 The dissent argued that section 312(a)(7) was included in the
bill to emphasize the public interest obligation "inherent in making broadcast
time available to candidates covered by the spending limitation." 84 Justice
White conceded that the statute "put teeth" into public interest obligation, but
did not believe that it created the broad rights granted federal candidates by
the FCC.8 5 The true intent of Congress in enacting section 312(a)(7) is unclear, but in the face of a lack of clarity, the Commission took an extreme
position regarding access.
Acknowledging that deference must be paid to agency interpretation of a
statute, Justice White argued that the appropriate amount of deference is determined by the validity of the agency's reasoning and the consistency of prior
rulings.8 6 Justice White concluded compellingly that the Commission has
87
been neither consistent nor persuasive in its arguments concerning this issue.
sized that it wished to formulate no specific rules because of a commitment to leaving the licensee
free to work out such judgments. Id. See also Anthony Martin-Trigona, 67 F.C.C.2d 743 (1978).
80. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C.2d at 682 (Washburn, Comm'r,
dissenting).
dissenting). The provision to which Justice White referred,
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2830 (White, J.,
47 U.S.C.k§ 315(b)(1) (1976),dprovides that during the forty-five day period preceding primary
dates or runoffs and during the sixty-day period preceding elections, the cost per unit of time sold
by a broadcaster may not exceed the station's lowest available charge for the same period, class
and amount of time.
82. 101 S.Ct. at 2834.
83. Id. at 2833.
84. Id. at 2834 (quoting S. Rep. 96, 92d Cong., IstSess. 28 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1773, 1781).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2835 (citing Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 101 S. Ct. 2142,
2148 n.13 (1981)).
87. Id.
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At least one scholar who has considered FCC policy in this area would no
doubt agree:
The best that can be said of Commission policy precedent in this area
[section 312(a)(7)] is that it is inconsistent. The worst to be said is
that the Commission has vascillated, changed directions, reversed itself often, blown hot and cold, and bent like a frail reed subject to
only the changing winds that each successive, changeable
majority of
s
the Commissioners brings to the decisionmaking8
Although the Commission in this case found CBS's five-minute counteroffers of non-prime time CBS insufficient,8 9 the Commission generally has
stated that candidates may not demand a certain length of time or a certain
period in the day for broadcasting purposes. In a 1976 ruling, HonorableDonald W. Riegle,90 the FCC upheld a licensee who refused to sell five-minute ads
during prime time, but instead offered five-minute and thirty-minute programs
in non-prime time. The Commission ruled that "[t]here is no evidence to suggest that through the passage of the reasonable access provision, the licensee is
now required to sell specific periods of time for political broadcasts." 9' In the
1978 Report and Order, the Commission reiterated its stand that although
some access to prime time should be afforded, candidates are not entitled to a
particular placement of his or her political announcement on a station's broadcast schedule. "It is best left to the discretion of a licensee when and on what
date a candidate's spot announcement or program should be aired." 92 CBS
offered the committee in this case non-prime-time and shorter program lengths
than the committee requested.93 According to prior policy, however, those
offers could be considered well within the realm of reasonableness.
The triggering of a right of access for a candidate under section 312(a)(7)
is the "start" of a campaign. 94 In this area, too, the FCC decision in this case
seems somewhat inconsistent with prior decisions holding firm for broadcaster
discretion. In a ruling on a complaint by Anthony Martin-Trigona, 95 in which
petitioner alleged that he had requested and was refused access in August 1977
88. Albert, The FCC Assumes a New Role as Regulator of Broadcast Advertising and Candidates' Access, 54 St. John's L. Rev. 279,295 (1980). The quotation refers to section 312(a)(7) and
to section 315, but the article discusses another FCC ruling, Senator Wendell Anderson, 69
F.C.C.2d 1265 (1978). See generally Chamberlin, supra note 33.
89. Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C.2d at 650.
90. 59 F.C.C.2d 1314 (1976).
91. Id. at 1314-15. See Anthony Martin-Trigona, 64 F.C.C.2d 1087 (1977) (A candidate requested and was refused program-length advertisements in prime time. The FCC ruled that the
candidate, who had instead been offered prime time one-minute spots, had not been denied reasonable access); Don C. Smith, 49 F.C.C.2d 678 (1974) (candidate enjoyed no right to purchase a
time of any particular or minimum duration); Honorable Pete Flaherty, 48 F.C.C.2d 838 (1974)
(Commission declined to recognize right by a federal candidate to program time of any particular
or minimum duration).
92. 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1091.
93. See 101 S. Ct. at 2818.
94. See 101 S. Ct. at 2825; 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
95. Anthony Martin-Trigona, 66 F.C.C.2d 968, application for review denied, 67 F.C.C.2d 33

(1977).
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for air time in preparation for a March 1978 primary, the FCC upheld the
licensee's judgment:
A licensee's discretion in providing coverage of elections extends not
only to the type and amount of time to be made available.., but to
the date on which its campaign coverage will commence. A licenbefore a
see's decision not to accept political advertising until 45 days
96
primary election cannot be said to be. . . unreasonable.
The 1978 Report and Order somewhat confuses the FCC's position on this
point. Noting that section 312(a)(7) and the "lowest unit charge" portion of
section 31597 were passed concurrently, the Commission suggested that the
time periods when the latter provision becomes applicable (sixty days before
an election and forty-five days before a primary) are also controlling on a
decision determining when a campaign has begun for section 312(a)(7) purposes.98 The Commission decided that it would be unreasonable for a licensee
to deny a federal candidate access within those periods, and perhaps before,
depending on circumstances. "We expect licensees to afford access at a reasonable time prior to a convention or caucus. We will review a licensee's decision in this area on a case-by-case basis." 99 In contrast, the Commission's
finding in CBS v. FCC and the Court's decision upholding that finding, in
effect make the decision whether a campaign has begun "based on a independent evaluation of the status of the campaign, taking into account the position
of the candidates and the networks as well as other factors." 10 0 As Justice
White argues, this evaluation undercuts broadcaster discretion and makes the
determination of the start of a campaign a matter of law for the FCC, which is
a clear departure from earlier practice. 1' 1
In an earlier explanation of section 312(a)(7), the FCC placed equal emphasis on individual candidates' needs and the other factors to be considered.
"In tailoring access to meet the needs of candidates for a particular office,
licensees may consider such factors as the unavailability of particular classes
of time; a multiplicity of candidates; the spec#7c desires of candidates; and
etc." 102 Earlier in the report the Commission concluded, "We continue to believe that the best method for achieving balance between the desires of candidates for air time and the commitments of licensees to the broadcast of types
of programming is to rely on the reasonable good faith discretion of individual
licensees."' 1 3 In the Supreme Court's ruling in this case, the candidates'
desires are given much more weight. Broadcasters are to
tailor their responses to accommodate, as much as reasonably possible, a candidate's stated purposes .... In responding to access re96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 969.
47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(a) (1976).
1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
74 F.C.C.2d at 665.
101 S. Ct. at 2837 (White, J., dissenting).
1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1090 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1089.
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quests, however, broadcasters may also give weight to such factors as
the amount of time previously sold to the candidate, the disruptive
impact on regular programming, and the likelihood of requests for
time by rival candidates under the equal opportunities provision of
§ 315(a). These considerations may not be invoked as pretexts for
denying access; to justify a negative response, broadcasters must cite
a realistic danger of substantial program disruption-perhaps caused
by insufficient notice to allow adjustments in the schedule or of an
excessive number of equal time requests. 104
The Court affirmed the Commission's rather cursory consideration of broadcaster concern over the number of candidates and the likelihood that these
candidates will demand equal time. 10 5 Although the race was the presidential
race, and 122 candidates had announced, the Commission and10 6the Court concluded that excessive demands for equal time were unlikely.
Inconsistencies are evident in the Commission's policies, and the Commission in essence has carved a path out of precedent that is not clearly mandated by that precedent. As one writer in reference to another decision stated,
"It is readily apparent that precedent could have been gleaned from the Commission's four major political broadcasting statements for any result the ma107
jority chose."'
Perhaps it is more important, then, to turn directly to what the Commission has "gleaned" from the CBS v. FCC decision. It becomes clear that
under the CBS decision, at every step of the process it is the Commission or
the candidate, rather than the broadcaster, who makes access determinations
in the final analysis. The Commission initially determines whether a candidate fits under section 312(a)(7) by deciding when a campaign has begun. The
Court argued that the FCC does not begin the campaign but rather makes an
independent objective decision whether it has begun.' 08 But when media coverage is as important as it is to campaigning in this country, it is naive to
suggest that the opening of the ."season" for political advertising will have
little effect on the commencement of campaign activities. In fact, since regular
programming clearly attracts and keeps more viewers than political advertisements, it is conceivable that licensees might provide less overall coverage of
potential candidates before the official start of the campaign to delay the signs
of a campaign that would lead the Commission to determine that a campaign
has begun. Obviously, a delay of overall coverage will lead to less total exposure of candidates to the public, a result clearly contrary to what the Commission perceives to be the purpose of section 312(a)(7).
After crossing the threshold question of campaign commencement,
broadcaster discretion gives way to candidate needs. The FCC originally proscribed broadcasters from instituting a flat ban on all access to media time for
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

101 S. Ct. at 2825.
Id. at 2829.
Id. at 2828; 74 F.C.C.2d at 674.
Albert, supra note 88, at 301.
101 S. Ct. at 2826; Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C.2d at 665.
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candidates for federal public office, instead encouraging the broadcasters to
engage in a balanced weighing of a number of factors in reaching their access
decisions.' 0 9 Justice White, in dissent in the CBS v. FCC decision, suggested
that the new emphasis on individual candidate needs undermines the equal
treatment mandate of section 315(a)(7). 110 It is not unlikely that one candidate's needs require that a licensee grant him or her greater access than it
would to another candidate. The licensee's obligation to provide equal access
does not disappear, however. Since the penalty under section 312(a)(7) is the
revocation of license, the licensee under this decision may be forced to provide
reasonable access to one candidate at the price of unequal access overall. The
Commission and the Court have insisted that broadcaster discretion remains
intact. Commission Lee dissented from this conclusion in the Commission's
opinion, stating,
I have listened carefully to my colleagues explain how this decision
leaves broadest discretion with the networks. However, the decision
doesn't have this effect. By the time the majority finishes its analysis
of the networks' reasons for not giving time, the networks do not
have any choice other than to give the requested time. No other
weighing of factors is reasonable in the view of the majority.'
Finally, after the threshold start-of-the-campaign issue is resolved and
candidate needs are assessed in a request for access, the Commission reviews a
licensee's decision. The Court indicates that if the licensee takes appropriate
factors into consideration, the Commission will defer to that judgment even if
the Commission's analysis would differ in the first instance. It is evident, however, that in this case the Commission substituted its judgment for that of the
licensee in considering CBS's reasons for its counteroffer to the Committee." 2
CBS, the network that did not flatly ban access before a certain date, cited the
multiplicity of candidates and potential for requests for equal access as reasons
for its refusal to grant the Committee's request. The Commission, however,
decided that it was unlikely that many of the 122 candidates would request
equal time, thereby rejecting CBS's experienced judgment as "speculative and
13
unsubstantiated at best."'
The above discussion examines the reduction of broadcaster discretion by
the Commission and by the Court in this case, a result that frightens proponents of a communications system controlled largely by independent licensees.
On the other hand, proponents of access will no doubt laud the decision, viewing it as an opening to the largely closed world of electronic media. In particular, they may see it as a contribution to overall voter awareness and
responsibility because of the public's increased exposure to debate among federal candidates. Access proponents urge that with as powerful a tool as nationwide broadcasting capabilities, networks should not be allowed to provide
109. 1978 Report & Order, supra note 15, at 1090.

110. 101 S. Ct. at 2838 (White,

i.,

dissenting).

111. 74 F.C.C.2d at 681 (Lee, Comm'r, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
112. Compare 1972 Policy Statement, supra note 71, at 536.
113. 74 F.C.C.2d at 674.

19821

1155

FCC LIMITS BROADCASTER DISCRETION

a voice only to those able to pay for it.114 Increased access may be an effective
weapon against the increasingly powerful and monopolistic networks, which
many believe to be a concentration of power in the most dangerous position
possible. As Professor Barron, an active advocate of access, argues,
Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of
free expression, a belief that the "marketplace of ideas" is freely accessible. But if ever there were a self-operating marketplace of ideas,
it has long ceased to exist. The mass media's development of an antipathy to ideas requires legal intervention if novel and unpopular
ideas are to be assured a forum. ....115
However compelling the arguments for increasing access may seem, it is
important to question whether the Supreme Court's affirmation of increased
access is worth the price of increased FCC intervention in the operation of
individual stations.1 16 First, there is no guarantee that an increased number of
voices will bring greater amounts of intelligent debate and discussion to the
public. As one author has suggested, "it is not at all clear why we should want
the media converted into sterile academics of balanced debate."' 1

7

Lange

predicts that increased access in public debate will bring about a "new centrism" regarding target issues at the cost of suppressing serious dissent in other
areas of public interest. Lange suggests that access rights may give rise to a
false sense that the nation is guarding against credulity. That false sense of
security will provide no protection against a resulting American orthodoxy.' 1 8
Increased access may also lengthen and increase the cost of campaigns
dramatically. Candidates may even be expected to campaign heavily early in
the political season to trigger the FCC's campaign commencement startingpistol. Clearly, a longer and thus more expensive campaign season is contrary
to the original purpose of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.1 9 For
those frightened by the increasing use of television marketing in campaigning,
with its attendant emphasis on selective and narrow political issues, broadened
access rights tend to increase fears of a media-blitzed, but uninformed, electorate. Further, a mandated right of access for federal candidates may cause
licensees to reduce time devoted to local campaigns in an effort to preserve
regularly scheduled broadcasting.
Probably the most disturbing aspect of this decision is the combination of
reduced broadcaster discretion and increased government intervention. That
access to the electronic media is limited is undeniable, but as Justice Douglas
argued in his concurrence in CBS v. Democratic National Committee:
[U]navailability of the press does not give courts carte blanche to
design systems of supervision and control or empower Congress to
114.
115.
116.
Section
117.
118.
119.

See B. Schmidt, supra note 34, at 37-54.
Barron, supra note 60 at 1641.
See Note, The Right of "Reasonable Access" for Federal Political Candidates Under
312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1287 (1978).
See Lange, supra note 60, at 79.
Id. at 89.
101 S.Ct. at 2834 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
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read the mandate in the First Amendment that "Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom.., of the press" to mean Congress
may, by acting directly or through any of its agencies such1 20as the
FCC make "some" laws abridging the freedom of the press.
Douglas voices in this concurrence his fears of the far-reaching consequences
of federal supervision in the even more generalized fairness doctrine area.
Though somewhat extreme in reference to the fairness doctrine, his fears bring
to mind a disturbing truth. Commissioners are appointed for seven-year terms
by presidents,1 2 1 who are political creatures, past candidates for political of122
fices and often future reelection candidates.
As one judge expressed it, "In evaluating the danger of government nonneutrality, we cannot ignore the fact that members of the Federal Communications Commission may well have more than a passing interest in the outcome of federal elections, particularly presidential elections." 12 3 Judge
Tamm, who concurred with the majority in the court of appeals opinion in
CBS v. FCC, noted that "[riegrettably there is some evidence that the Commission has, on occasion, been subjected to direct political pressure."' 124 Specifically, in the Watergate tapes of the Nixon administration, President Nixon
is heard to threaten to try to block a license renewal for a Washington Postowned radio station for political reasons. 125 In another setting Charles Colson
indicated that to create an inhibiting impact on the networks, he would "pursue with Dean Burch (FCC Commissioner) the possibility of getting a ruling
by the FCC as soon as we have a majority."' 126 Judge Tamm warned that the
"inherently political nature of the questions to be considered will draw the
Commission into a situation where the impartiality will be subject to obvious
questions. The danger that standards will not be applied neutrally necessarily
27
suggests the unconstitutionality of the system of government regulation."'
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has affirmed a Commission interpretation of section 312(a)(7) that involves a much greater degree of government
intervention in the operation of a broadcasting station than did the general
public interest standard. The Supreme Court, basing its decision on legislative
history and prior commission rulings, agreed with the FCC that the statute
creates a general affirmative right of access for federal candidates. Weighing
the importance of maintaining a high level of broadcaster discretion with the
importance of opportunities for robust political debate, the Court came out on
120. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 160 (Douglas, J., concurring).

121. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1976).
122. See Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on a Regulatory
Watchdog, 64 Va. L. Rev. 169, 183-84 (1978).
123. 629 F.2d at 32 (ramm, I., concurring).
124. Id. at 33 n.16. (ramm, J., concurring).
125. Id. (quoting Taped Statement of Richard Nixon to H.R. Haldeman & John Dean (Sept.
15, 1972)), quoted in Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Rep. No. 981,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1974)).
126. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Charles W. Colson to H.R. Haldeman (Sept. 25, 1970)),
reprinted in Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 Duke L.J. 213, 247.
127. Id. at 32 (quoting CBS Brief at 44).
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the side of greater access. Considering the variety of possible interpretations
of the legislative history and Commission precedent, the Court's conclusions
seem sweeping, overly broad and somewhat frightening. Justice Stewart in
CBS v. DemocraticNationalCommittee stated, "iTihere is never a paucity of
arguments in favor of limiting the freedom of the press." 128 Justice Douglas in
the same case argued that federal supervision in general is contrary to our
constitutional mandate and warned of the consequences of too much regulation at the cost of individual licensee discretion. He argued that government
intervention makes
the broadcast licensee an easy victim of political pressures and
reduces him to a timid and submissive segment of the press whose
measure of the public interest will now be echoes of the dominant
political voice that emerges after every election. The affair with freeproud will now bear only a faint likeness
dom of which we have been129
of our former robust days.
His fears perhaps should be our own.
ANDREA DENISE SMITH

128. 412 U.S. at 144 (Stewart, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 164-5 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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